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a b s t r a c t
Cryptographic operations are essential formany security-critical systems. Reasoning about
information flow in such systems is challenging because typical (noninterference-based)
information-flow definitions allow no flow from secret to public data. Unfortunately, this
implies that programs with encryption are ruled out because encrypted output depends
on secret inputs: the plaintext and the key. However, it is desirable to allow flows arising
from encryption with secret keys provided that the underlying cryptographic algorithm
is strong enough. In this article we conservatively extend the noninterference definition
to allow safe encryption, decryption, and key generation. To illustrate the usefulness of
this approach, we propose (and implement) a type system that guarantees noninterference
for a small imperative language with primitive cryptographic operations. The type system
prevents dangerous program behavior (e.g., giving away a secret key or confusing keys and
nonkeys), which we exemplify with secure implementations of cryptographic protocols.
Because themodel is based on a standard noninterference property, it allows us to develop
some natural extensions. In particular, we consider public-key cryptography and integrity,
which accommodate reasoning about primitives that are vulnerable to chosen-ciphertext
attacks.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Cryptographic operations are ubiquitous in security-critical systems. Reasoning about information flow in such systems
is challenging because typical information-flow definitions allow no flow from secret to public data. The latter requirement
underlies noninterference [12,17], which demands that public outputs are unchanged as secret inputs are varied. While
traditional noninterference breaks in the presence of cryptographic operations, the challenge is to distinguish between
breaking noninterference because of legitimate use of sufficiently strong encryption and breaking noninterference due to
an unintended leak.
A common approach to handling cryptographic primitives in information-flow aware systems is by allowing
declassification of encryption results. The intention of declassification is that the result of encryption can be released to the
attacker. Declassification, however, is a versatile mechanism: different declassification dimensions correspond to different
reasons why information is released [32,3]. Attempts at framing cryptographically-masked flows into different dimensions
have been made although, as we discuss, not always with satisfactory results.
In this article, we introduce cryptographic primitives into an information-flow setting while preserving a form of
noninterference property. This is achieved by building into themodel a basic assumption that attackers may not distinguish
between ciphertexts and that decryption using the wrong key fails. Although this assumption is stronger than some
probabilistic and computational cryptographicmodels (which allow some information to leakwhen comparing ciphertexts),
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Fig. 1. From noninterference to cryptographically-masked flows.
we argue that it can still be reasonable, and that it opens up possibilities for tracking information flow in the presence of
cryptographic primitives in expressive programming languages.
The intuition behind our approach is sketched below and illustrated in Fig. 1, where dashed and solid lines correspond
to secret and public values, respectively. Fixing some public (low) input zL and varying secret (high) input from xH to yH
may not reflect on a public output z ′L of a system that satisfies noninterference (illustrated in Fig. 1(a)). Suppose the system
in question involves encryption, such as in the program z = encrypt(k, x) for some secret key k. Clearly, noninterference
is broken: variation in the secret input from xH to yH may cause variation in the public output from z ′L to z
′′
L (illustrated in
Fig. 1(b)).
However, noninterference can be recovered if the result of encryption is possibly any value v. Thismeans that variation of
the high input from xH to yH does not affect the public output—any value v is a possible public output in both cases. This form
of noninterference is known as possibilistic noninterference [25] (illustrated in Fig. 1(c)). Overall, although low outputs might
depend on low inputs and ciphertexts, no observation about possible low outputs may reveal information about changes in
high inputs (illustrated in Fig. 1(d)).
This article makes a case for possibilistic noninterference as a natural model for cryptographically-masked flows. We
show that a naive approach of collapsing all ciphertexts as indistinguishable opens up possibilities for occlusion [32], where
masking an intended information flow in an indistinguishability definitionmay alsomask other unintended leaks. Therefore,
we propose a finer indistinguishability relation that not only avoids occlusion but also, by a recent result by Laud [22],
guarantees computational security under some natural assumptions on the cryptographic primitives. With such a result at
hand, our model allows focusing on enforcing a simple possibilistic property, which comes with a computational guarantee
‘‘for free’’.
To demonstrate that enforcing possibilistic noninterference is straightforward, we have designed and implemented
a security type system that provably enforces possibilistic noninterference for an imperative language with primitive
cryptographic operations and communication channels. The type system prevents dangerous program behavior (e.g., giving
away a secret key or confusing keys or nonkeys), which we exemplify with secure implementations of cryptographic
protocols. Because the model is based on a standard noninterference property, it allows us to develop some natural
extensions. In particular, we consider public-key cryptography and integrity, which accommodates reasoning about
primitives that are vulnerable to chosen-ciphertext attacks. The main soundness result (that the type system indeed
guarantees security) is based on our formalization in the proof assistant Coq.
This article is a revised and extended version of [2]. Compared to the earlier version, the most significant contribution
is a formalization of the soundness proof in the proof assistant Coq, which has helped crystallizing definitions and making
our assumptions about cryptographic schemes more precise. In addition to this we have modified the language to obtain a
clearer semantics, included the full presentation of the semantic and typing rules, expanded thewide-mouthed frog protocol
example, updated the related work, and made other improvements throughout the article.
2. Language
We explore how to model cryptographic flows in a small imperative language equipped with encryption and decryption
primitives, dynamic key generation, and channels for communication. This section introduces the syntax and semantics of
the language.
2.1. Syntax
The syntax of the language is defined in Fig. 2. Let x ∈ VarName range over the set of variable names, ch ∈ ChanName
range over the set of channel names, A range over the set of actor names, and let n ∈ Z range over the integers.
A program consists of a sequence of actors, where an actor is a named command. The key levels, ranged over by γ , declare
the maximum value security level the key can safely encrypt. Intuitively, high keys are allowed to encrypt both secrets
84 A. Askarov et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 402 (2008) 82–101
Fig. 2. Syntax.
and nonsecrets, whereas low keys are only allowed to encrypt nonsecrets; a more thorough discussion of this is found in
the section on semantics below. The commands include the standard commands of an imperative language, commands
for sending on and receiving from a given channel, and a command for generating new keys. Apart from expressions
for encryption and decryption, expressions are standard: integers, variables, total binary operators, pair formation, and
projection. Key values and encrypted values are excluded from the expression syntax; from a security perspective neither
should appear as constants in the program text.
2.2. Semantics
The semantics of the system is defined as a big-step operational semantics. The actors of a program run concurrently and
interact with each other by sending and receiving messages on channels. We refrain from modeling the semantics for the
entire system and instead provide semantics for isolated actors. Thus we deliberately ignore information flows via races and
other flows that may arise in concurrent systems (cf. [30]). These flows are typically harder to exploit, although reasoning
about such flows in our setting is still a worthwhile topic for future work.
We begin by defining the values of the language, which are used in the definition of the semantics for expressions and
commands.
2.2.1. Values
Let KeyLK and KeyHK be two disjoint sets of keys, ranged over by kLK and kHK respectively, and let k range over KeyLK∪KeyHK.
Let u ∈ U range over a set of bit strings representing the encrypted values. The values are built up by the ordinary values,
integers, keys and pairs of values, together with the encrypted values.
values ∈ Value v ::= n | kLK | kHK | (v1, v2) | u.
The system is parameterized over two symmetric encryption schemes—one for each key level γ . An encryption scheme is a
triple S = (K, E,D), with the following properties:
• K is a key generation algorithm that on each invocation generates a new key from the set Keyγ associated with the
encryption scheme.
• E is a nondeterministic encryption algorithm that takes a key and a bit string and returns a bit string—the ciphertext.
In the following, we use E(k, v) to denote the set of possible ciphertexts that the value v can be encrypted to under the
key k, and u ∈ E(k, v) to denote that u is such a ciphertext.
• D is a deterministic decryption algorithm that takes a key and a ciphertext and returns a bit string – the decryption of
the ciphertext – or fails. Moreover,D is a keyed left inverse of E , i.e., u ∈ E(k, v) =⇒ D(k, u) = v, and only ciphertexts
can be decrypted, i.e.,D(k, u) = v =⇒ u ∈ E(k, v).
Let SLK represent the encryption scheme associated with the low-key level and similarly let SHK represent the high
encryption scheme.
The reason for the use of twodifferent encryption schemes for different security levels is to lay the ground for an extension
of the system into a generalmulti-level system, i.e., a systemwithmore than two security levels. The standardway of defining
security for amulti-level system is in terms of a two-level system. This is done by demanding that for a program to be secure
in the multi-level system it should be secure in the two-level system for all order preserving mappings from the multi-level
lattice into the two-level lattice.
The idea of the low and high encryption schemes is to represent the mapping of the multi-level system described
above. Thus, the low encryption scheme represents the untrusted encryption schemes (for the given mapping) and the
high encryption scheme represents the trusted ones. For this reason, we assume different properties of the two encryption
schemes. We discuss these properties in detail in Section 3.
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Fig. 3. Semantics of expressions.
To be able to use our encryption schemes on values in general we need a way to encode integers, keys and pairs of values
into bit strings and to decode bit strings back into values, when possible. We assume two functions: encode, that takes a
value and returns its bit-string representation, and decode, that takes a bit string and returns the represented value, if any.
Obviously, encode and decode should be inverses w.r.t. the decodable subdomain of bit strings. In the following, we shall
assume that the encryption and decryption functions have been lifted to values by proper composition with the encode and
decode functions, so that encryption takes a value and returns a bit string and decryption takes a bit string and returns a
value. Thus, encode and decodewill not be explicitly mentioned.
2.2.2. Environments
Input and output are modeled in terms of streams of values with the cons operation ‘‘·’’ and the distinguished empty
stream . This is a simplified model of input/output, where the input from the environment does not explicitly depend on
preceding output to the environment. However,we expect that such a simplification has no impact on the security of isolated
actors. Indeed, Clark andHunt [11] observe that, thanks to the quantification over all streams, itmakes no differencewhether
input/output ismodeled in terms of strategies or streams as long as the program is deterministic.We expect this observation
to apply to our setting, since the nondeterminism in our language is limited to encryption primitives, and programs may
not branch on ciphertexts. Hence, the control flow of the program as well as its resulting nonciphertext values remain
deterministic.
Let ks range over finite streams of keys, and vs over finite streams of values. Finite streams are sufficient, since our
semantics only models finitely running programs (cf. Sections 2.3 and 2.4). The full environment E = (M,G, I,O) consists
of four components: (i) the variable environmentM , which is a mapping from variable names to values; (ii) the key-stream
environment G, which maps encryption scheme levels to streams of keys generated by successive use of the key generator;
(iii) the input environment I and (iv) the output environment O, which map channel names to streams of values.
2.3. Semantics of expressions
The evaluation of expressions has the form 〈M, e〉 ⇓ v: evaluating the expression e in the variable environmentM yields
the value v. The semantics of integers, variables, total binary operators, pair formation, and projection are entirely standard.
Fig. 3 presents the semantic rules for expressions.
The rules specific to the treatment of cryptography are encryption (S-ENC) and decryption (S-DEC) which both use the
encryption schemesSγ introduced above. SinceE is nondeterministic, i.e., it returns a set of different ciphertexts for the same
key and plaintext, the semantics becomes nondeterministic—there is one separate semantic rule per possible ciphertext.
2.4. Semantics of commands
Fig. 4 presents the semantics for commands. Commands are state transformers of the form 〈E, c〉 ⇓ E ′: the command
c yields the new environment E ′ when run in the environment E. The semantics of the commands is mostly standard for
a while language with channels—the only rule specific to encryption is the rule for key generation (S-NEWKEY). It takes a
variable and a level of the key to be generated and assigns the topmost element in the key stream associated to that level in
the key-stream environment to that variable. Input and output are both provided as commands (S-INPUT and S-OUTPUT).
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Fig. 4. Semantics of commands.
3. Security
This section introduces possibilistic noninterference as a semantic model of security for programs with encryption.
We begin by stating two assumptions we make on encryption and decryption. Thereafter we argue that standard
noninterference cannot be used to model encryption, because of a problem known as occlusion. Instead, we suggest
possibilistic noninterference and showhow this can be used togetherwith the assumed properties of the encryption scheme
tomodel safe uses of encryptionwithout introducing occlusion. The section concludes by investigating the relation between
our assumptions and common cryptographic attacker models.
3.1. Assumptions on the cryptographic primitives
Webeginwith an informal discussion of two properties of the encryption schemes thatwe need.We use these properties
to formulate and prove possibilistic noninterference for our system. Section 3.5 discusses how these properties relate to
standard computational properties.
The first property is a confidentiality property. It states the indistinguishability of ciphertexts for high encryption schemes.
Intuitively, this captures the attacker’s capability to learn anything about the plaintext by observing the ciphertext. In
particular, indistinguishability gives us full freedom in the process of defining a low-equivalence relation for ciphertexts.
We do not assume indistinguishability of the ciphertexts of the low encryption scheme.
The second property is an authenticity property needed in the treatment of decryption. More precisely we are assuming
that decryption using the wrong key fails:
u ∈ E(k′, v) =⇒ D(k, u) = ⊥ if k 6= k′.
We assume that the same property holds for the decryption function of the low encryption scheme.
The assumption that encryption with the wrong key fails gives us that each ciphertext is successfully decryptable with
one unique key, which is captured by the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Uniqueness of decryption keys.
D(k1, u) = v1 ∧D(k2, u) = v2 ∧ v1 6= ⊥ ∧ v2 6= ⊥ =⇒ k1 = k2.
Proof. D(k1, u) = v1 gives that u ∈ E(k1, v1), since only ciphertexts are decryptable. Now, assume that k1 6= k2; the
property that encryption with the wrong key fails gives D(k2, u) = ⊥ from u ∈ E(k1, v1). However, this contradicts the
assumption thatD(k2, u) = v2, and v2 6= ⊥. Hence k1 = k2. 
Note that this lemma implies a uniqueness property of decryption results, i.e., not only can we show k1 = k2 under the
assumptions of the lemma but also v1 = v2, since decryption is deterministic.
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3.2. Insufficiency of standard noninterference
The prevailing notion when defining confidentiality in the analysis of information flows is noninterference.
Noninterference is typically formalized as the preservation of a low-equivalence relation under the execution of a program:
if a program is run in two low-equivalent environments then the resulting environments should be low-equivalent. For
ordinary values, like integers, low-equivalence demands that low values are equal. From the assumption that ciphertexts
are indistinguishable we are free to chose any low-equivalence relation for ciphertexts. For instance, one may consider it
secure to treat all ciphertexts as low-equivalent. However appealing this may be, such a treatment leads to the ability of
masking implicit flows in ciphertexts. Consider the program in Listing 1 for some high encryption key stored in the variable
k and some value stored in the variable a.
l1:= encryptHK(k, a);
if h then l2 := encryptHK(k, a)
else l2 := l1;
Listing 1. Occlusion
If all encrypted values are considered low-equivalent thenwe cannot
distinguish between the two lowvariables l1 and l2 even though it is clear
that the equality/inequality of the first and the second values reflects
the secret value h. This is an instance of a general problem known as
occlusion [32] (which we recall from the introduction), where masking
an intended information flow in an indistinguishability definition may
also mask other unintended leaks. In the rest of the article, we will refer
to the problem illustrated in Listing 1 as the occlusion problem or, simply, occlusion.
For standard noninterference, any other relation than the one that simply relates all ciphertexts removes the possibility
to consider secure uses of encryption for noninterference. Instead, we use a variant of noninterference known as possibilistic
noninterference, which allows us to create a notion of low-equivalence that semantically rejects occlusion without
preventing intuitively secure uses.
3.3. Possibilistic noninterference
Let Σ denote the type environment under which programs are run and let E1 ∼Σ E2 denote that the environments E1
and E2 are low-equivalent w.r.t the type environment Σ . Section 4 defines how type environments are built. For now we
only use that if E1 ∼Σ E2 then environments E1 and E2 are low-equivalent, i.e., indistinguishable for an attacker. A pair of
commands c1 and c2 are possibilistically noninterfering if
NI(c1, c2)Σ ≡ ∀E1, E2 . E1 ∼Σ E2∧
〈E1, c1〉 ⇓ Eˆ1 ∧ Eˆ1 6= ∅ ∧ 〈E2, c2〉 ⇓ Eˆ2 ∧ Eˆ2 6= ∅ =⇒
∀E ′1 ∈ Eˆ1 . ∃E ′2 ∈ Eˆ2 . E ′1 ∼Σ E ′2 ∧ ∀E ′2 ∈ Eˆ2 . ∃E ′1 ∈ Eˆ1 . E ′1 ∼Σ E ′2
where the evaluation relation is lifted to a set of results as follows:
〈E, c〉 ⇓ Eˆ iff Eˆ = {E ′ | 〈E, c〉 ⇓ E ′}.
Intuitively, for every pair of low-equivalent environments in which the commands terminate it holds that there exists a
possibility that each environment produced by the first commandwhen run in the first environment can be produced by the
second command when run in the second environment.
A program c is considered securew.r.t.Σ if it is noninterfering with itself, i.e., NI(c, c)Σ .
It is straightforward to see that the noninterference relation is symmetric and transitive (because the low-equivalence
relation∼Σ is symmetric and transitive), but not reflexive. If it were reflexive then all programswould be considered secure.
By only considering environments for which the commands terminate, we ignore crash-related leaks.
3.4. Adequacy of possibilistic noninterference
The choice of possibilistic noninterference does not automatically solve the above problem—like before, using the full
low-equivalence relation on ciphertexts leads to occlusion. Let .= denote the low-equivalence relation for ciphertexts, used
in the definition of low-equivalence for environments ∼Σ (via low-equivalence for values ∼τ ; see Section 4.2 below). To
allow for secure usages of encryption, while at the same time protecting from occlusion we put the following demands on
.=:
u1 ∈ EHK(k1, v1) =⇒ ∃u2 . u2 ∈ EHK(k2, v2) ∧ u1 .= u2 (1)
∃u1, u2 . u1 ∈ EHK(k1, v1) ∧ u2 ∈ EHK(k2, v2) ∧ u1 6 .= u2. (2)
The first demand ensures the possibility for safe usages, while the second one excludes occlusion. In addition to this
we demand that .= is an equivalence relation, and that .= does not relate ciphertexts of different sizes. The former of the
additional demands allows the low-equivalence relation∼Σ to be an equivalence relation, and the latter is needed since we
do not assume that the cryptographic primitives hide the length of the plaintexts. If such an assumption is made (as is the
case in Laud’s work [22]), the latter demand can be safely dropped.
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3.4.1. Safe uses of encryption
In the setting of possibilistic noninterference we must make sure that any ciphertext produced by each plaintext
and key has a low-equivalent ciphertext for any other choice of plaintext and key. To see this consider the program
l := encryptHK(k, a) for somehigh key k and some secret value a. Assume that E1 and E2 are two low-equivalent environments
such that E1(a) = v1, E2(a) = v2, E1(k) = k1, and E2(k) = k2. The execution of l := encryptHK(k, a) yields:
Eˆ1 = {E1[l 7→ u] | u ∈ EHK(k1, v1)}, and Eˆ2 = {E2[l 7→ u] | u ∈ EHK(k2, v2)}
Clearly, given the property expressed by Eq. (1) for every environment in Eˆ1 there is a low-equivalent environment in Eˆ2.
3.4.2. Exclusion of occlusion
To see that Eq. (2) excludes occlusion, let us consider the execution of the occlusion example in Listing 1. To argue by
contradiction, suppose the program is noninterfering. Assume now that E1 and E2 are two low-equivalent environments
such that E1(h) = false, E2(h) = true, E1(a) = v1, E2(a) = v2, E1(k) = k1, and E2(k) = k2. The result of running the program
in E1 is the set
Eˆ1 = {E1[l1 7→ u, l2 7→ u] | u ∈ EHK(k1, v1)}
and the result of running it in the second environment E2 is the set
Eˆ2 = {E2[l1 7→ u1, l2 7→ u2] | u1 ∈ EHK(k2, v2), u2 ∈ EHK(k2, v2)}.
Possibilistic noninterference demands that for each environment in Eˆ2 there exists a low-equivalent environment in Eˆ1.
Let us pick an environment from Eˆ2 where u1 ∈ EHK(k2, v2) and u2 ∈ EHK(k2, v2) such that u1 6 .= u2. Such u1 and u2 exist
by Eq. (2). By possibilistic noninterference, there exists an environment E ′1 in Eˆ1 such that E
′
1(l1)
.= u1 and E ′1(l2) .= u2.
However, by construction of Eˆ1 we have that E ′1(l1) = E ′1(l2) = u for some u. We have u .= u1 and u .= u2. This implies
u1
.= u2 by transitivity, which contradicts the initial choice of u1 and u2.
3.4.3. Plausibility of low-equivalence properties
Now, it remains to show that the properties of Eqs. (1) and (2) are plausible for ciphertexts originating from existing
cryptographic primitives. We do this by showing that for probabilistic symmetric encryption schemes we can easily form a
low-equivalence relation satisfying Eqs. (1) and (2).
Probabilistic symmetric encryption schemes generate a random initial vector iv on every invocation of the encryption
function ENCImpl, where the value of iv is used in computing the ciphertext for plaintext v using key k, and E(k, v) =
∪ivENCImpl(iv, k, v). We define low-equivalence .= by relating equally-sized ciphertexts with the same random initial vector:
∀k1, k2, v1, v2 . ENCImpl(iv, k1, v1) .= ENCImpl(iv, k2, v2).
Since this relation relates two ciphertexts if and only if they were created with the same initial vector, we have that for
any choice of plaintext and key there will be exactly one related ciphertext for any other plaintext and key. The existence
guarantees Eq. (1), and the uniqueness guarantees Eq. (2), since there is more than one possible initial vector.
To exemplify this, consider cipher-block chaining (CBC) with a random initial vector encryption scheme [29]. The
encryption algorithm in this scheme is a two-step process: (i) generating a random initial vector iv, and (ii) using the
generated iv to compute the ciphertext. Let CBCImpl(iv, k, v) correspond to the second step of the implementation; the
ciphertext returned by the encryption algorithm is a tuple of the form (iv, u), where iv is generated in the first step and
u = CBCImpl(iv, k, v) is computed in the second one. Then we can define two ciphertexts (iv1, u1) and (iv2, u2) produced
by this scheme as low-equivalent ( .=) if they are equally-sized and agree upon initial vectors, i.e., iv1 = iv2. Putting this
definition to the test with the occlusion example, we can see that the occlusion example is indeed rejected for the same
general reasons as in the previous subsection.
3.5. Relation to computational adversary models
Recently, Laud [22] has investigated under which conditions our possibilistic noninterference of Section 3.3 implies
computational security. It is reassuring that Laud’s requirements on the underlying encryption scheme are essentially
those that we conjectured in an earlier version [2] of this article: (i) indistinguishability of ciphertexts under chosen
plaintext attacks (IND-CPA), which provides ciphertexts confidentiality, and (ii) integrity of plaintexts (INT-PTXT), which
achieves authenticity. In Laud’s work, these notions are strengthened compared to their standard definitions to also hide
key identities [7]. Laud points out that such primitives can be easily constructed in the random oracle models [6].
While the language of [22] is simpler compared to the one presented here, we believe his proof technique
straightforwardly generalizes to our full system. With such a result at hand, we are ready to capitalize on the modularity of
our approach. For a given language and type system, as soon aswe can prove that all well-typed programs are noninterfering,
we automatically get computational security. This opens up possibilities for reasoning about expressive languages and
type systems, where all we have to worry about are noninterference proofs (which are typically simpler than proofs of
computational soundness).
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Fig. 5.Well-formedness.
4. Types
The syntax of the types is defined in Fig. 2. A primitive type is either a security annotated basic type, a pair of primitive
types or a key type. The security annotation assigns a security level to the basic type expressing whether it is high or low. The
types of encrypted values are structural in the sense that the type reflects the original type of the encrypted values as well
as the level of the key that was used in the encryption. For instance, encHK (int H) L is the type of a high integer that has been
encryptedwith a high key once and encHK (encHK (int H) L) L is the type of an integer that has been encryptedwith a high key
twice. The type of the variable environmentΩ is a map from variables to primitive types, the type of the input environment
and the output environment Θ is a map from channel names to primitive types, and the key-stream environment defines
its own type (in the domain of the environment). The type of the entire environment,Σ = (Ω,Θ), is the pair of a variable
type environment and a channel type environment.
4.1. Well-formed values
Well-formedness defines the meaning of the nonsecurity part of the types, by telling what values have what types. The
well-formedness relation is defined in Fig. 5.
The integers are the onlywell-formed values of type int. The set of low keys and the set of high keys form thewell-formed
values of the low-key type and the high-key type respectively. An encrypted value is well-formed w.r.t. an encryption type
if there exists a well-formed key that decrypts the encrypted value to a well-formed value. A pair is well-formed w.r.t. a
pair type if both parts of the pair are well-formed w.r.t. the corresponding part of the pair type. Streams, i.e., the input
environment, the output environment and the key streams, are well-formed if all their elements are well-formed in the
type corresponding to the stream. Finally, the environments are well-formed if all their parts are well-formed.
4.2. Low-equivalence
Fig. 6 contains the low-equivalence relation. For complex types, i.e., pairs, environments and streams, low-equivalence
is defined structurally by demanding the parts of the complex type to be low-equivalent w.r.t. the corresponding types.
Any values are low-equivalent w.r.t. a high type. Integers are low-equivalent w.r.t. a low-integer type if they are equal.
Low-equivalence for keys is slightly different since keys are not annotated with a security level – only a key level – whose
meaning is defined by well-formed values as different sets. Even though it is semantically meaningful to add a security level
to key types – the values of keys can be indirectly affected by computation – we have chosen not to. Instead, a low key is
considered to be of low security and a high key of high security. Thus, low keys are low-equivalent if they are equal, and any
two high keys are low-equivalent.
The most interesting rules are the rules defining low-equivalence w.r.t. a low-encryption type (LE-ENC-L1) and (LE-ENC-
L2). Common to both rules is that there must exist a pair of low-equivalent keys w.r.t. the key type of the encryption type
that successfully decrypt the encrypted values. The differences between the rules reflect the difference between encryption
with a high and a low key.
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Fig. 6. Low-equivalence.
Fig. 7. Subtyping.
Rule (LE-ENC-L1) for encryption with a high key connects the low-equivalence relation .= on ciphertexts with low-
equivalence on values ∼τ . In (LE-ENC-L1), the encrypted values must be low-equivalent w.r.t. the low-equivalence relation.=, and the values to be encrypted should be low-equivalent w.r.t. the primitive type, τ , of the encryption type.
Since ciphertexts created by low keys can be decrypted by anyone (we assume that the low keys are freely available), we
have to demand that the inside of the encrypted value contains only low values. This is done in the (LE-ENC-L2) rule, which
demands that the inside is not only low-equivalent w.r.t. its type τ , but low-equivalent w.r.t. tolow(τ ), which is defined as
follows:
tolow(t σ) = t L tolow(key LK) = key LK tolow((τ1, τ2)) = (tolow(τ1), tolow(τ2)).
Observe that tolow(key HK) is undefined to exclude the possibility of encrypting a high key with a low one. This way, we
make certain that the result of decrypting low-equivalent encrypted values will result in low-equivalent values and that
high values are not stored inside encrypted values that are created by low keys.
4.3. Subtyping
The subtyping is entirely standard; it allows low information to be seen as highwith the exception of invariant subtyping
for keys. The subtyping relation for primitive types, <:, and the subtyping relation for security levels, v, define the
corresponding join operators. The rules for subtyping can be found in Fig. 7.
4.4. Expression type rules
The type rules for expressions, defined in Fig. 8, are of the formΩ ` e : τ . Encryptionwith high keys will always result in
low encrypted values. Encryptionwith low keys is possible on any value but produces a result that is as secret as the original
value. The type rule for low encryption makes use of function lvl(·) that computes the security level of the given value:
lvl(t σ) = σ lvl((τ1, τ2)) = lvl(τ1) unionsq lvl(τ2) lvl(key LK) = L lvl(key HK) = H.
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Fig. 8. Type rules of expressions.
Decryption is allowed only if the key level of the key used for decryption matches the key level of the encrypted value.
The result of the decryption is tainted by the security level of the encrypted values. The taint function is defined as
follows:
(t σ)σ
′ = t (σ unionsq σ ′) (τ1, τ2)σ = (τ σ1 , )τ σ2 (key LK)L = key LK (key HK)σ = key HK
Note that the taint function is not defined for (key LK)H—neither keeping the key level as LK nor raising it to HK is adequate
in this case. The reason for this is the choice to not decorate key types with an additional security level as discussed in
Section 4.2.
4.5. Command type rules
The type rules for commands, defined in Fig. 9, are of the form Σ, pc ` c. As with expressions most of the rules are
standard for a security type system (cf. [38]). In order to prevent implicit flows, we adopt the notion of a security context [14].
The security context of a program point is defined to be the least upper bound of the security levels of the conditional
expressions of the enclosing conditionals. The context affects the commands with side effects, i.e., variable assignment, key
generation, input, and output. The type rule for sequences of statements (T-SEQ) checks both statements of the sequence.
If and while are the two constructs that can lead to implicit flows since they affect the control flow. Thus, the body of the
if and while are checked in the context of the security level of the control expression. This way, when a branch depends
on a secret, the body of that branch is prevented from causing any low side effects. The generation of a new key with the
requested security level results in a key with that security level if the requested level is not below the context type. The
reason for this is that we assume that the low-key stream is publicly observable.
Returning to the occlusion problem, we note that the program in Listing 1 is rejected by our type system. In particular, it
is rejected by rule (T-IF) for the same reasons assigning to a low integer would be rejected.
On a general note, it is important to recall that it is not the type rule (T-IF) itself that is central to our contribution, but it
is the semantic justification of rules (T-IF) and (T-ENC1) in combination that rules out weaker, occlusion-prone, versions of
(T-IF).
5. Soundness
This section introduces and proves a number of relevant properties of the system. In particular, we introduce
noninterference for expressions and prove that well-typed expressions are noninterfering, i.e., secure.
We focus on the soundness of the expressions, since all the encryption relevant additions are in the expression language.
The security conditions for commands are similar to the ones for expressions; their proofs do not differ from any standard
proofs of possibilistic noninterference. The proof for the expressions has been formalized in the proof assistant Coq and is
available from the second author’s homepage.1 Below,wedetail the parts of the proof specific for the treatment of encryption
and decryption; we refer the reader to the formal proof for the details of the standard parts of the proofs.
1 http://www.cs.chalmers.se/~utter.
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Fig. 9. Type rules of commands.
Fig. 10. Set-lifted semantics for expressions.
5.1. Set-lifted semantics
Theproof is carried out in a set-lifted version of the semantics in this article for proof-technical reasons; since the standard
semantics results in a set of values (because of the nondeterministic model of encryption) it is convenient to work in a set-
lifted semantics when using the induction hypotheses.
Thus, in the following we will use an evaluation relation for expressions that relates sets of variable environments to
sets of values 〈Mˆ, e〉 ⇓ vˆ, and, similarly, for statements a relation that relates sets of environments to sets of environments
〈Eˆ1, c〉 ⇓ Eˆ2. Fig. 10 contains the set-lifted semantics for the expressions, given to support the proofs of this section.
The connection between the original semantics in the article and the set-lifted semantics is captured in the following
two lemmas. The first lemma says that the set-lifted semantics models all of the original semantics.
Lemma 2. Coverage of the proof semantics of expressions.
〈M, e〉 ⇓ v ⇒ ∃̂v . v ∈ v̂ ∧ 〈{M}, e〉 ⇓ v̂.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of 〈M, e〉 ⇓ v. 
The second lemma says that the set semantic does not introduce anything not modeled by the original semantics.
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Lemma 3. Precision of the proof semantics of expressions.
〈{M}, e〉 ⇓ v̂ =⇒ ∀v . v ∈ v̂ =⇒ 〈M, e〉 ⇓ v.
Proof. By induction on the structure of e. 
5.2. Leaf determinism
We begin by proving an important property of expressions that intuitively is a stronger version of the preservation of
types; preservation of types expresses that well-formedness is preserved under execution of well-typed programs.
We define leaf determinism as follows
{n} :: int σ {kγ } :: key γ
{v | u ∈ Eγ (kγ , v), u ∈ û} :: τ
û :: encγ τ σ
û = {(v1, v2) | v1 ∈ û1, v2 ∈ û2} û1 :: τ1 û2 :: τ2
û2 :: (τ1, τ2)
{M(x) |M ∈ Mˆ} :: Ω(x)
Mˆ :: Ω
.
This relation is equivalent to a set-lifted version of the standard well-formedness relation with the addition of the demand
that any well-formed set of values decrypt to one unique value. The idea is to capture that all nondeterminism comes from
the encryption and not from any other source, i.e., that all values apart from encrypted values are deterministic. If V :: T
for some set V and some type T we say that V is leaf deterministic. To exemplify, if we have a set of keys kˆ, that is leaf
deterministic, i.e., kˆ :: key γ we know that it is a singleton set. Furthermore, if we have a set of encrypted values uˆ that is leaf
deterministic w.r.t. encγ int σ , say, û :: encγ int σ that set is not a singleton, but we know that all values in the set decrypt
to the same integer, since the set {v | u ∈ Eγ (k, v), u ∈ û} used to form uˆ is leaf deterministic w.r.t int, which means it is a
singleton set.
The connection between leaf determinism andwell-formedness is captured by the following two lemmas. First, as hinted
above, leaf determinism implies well-formedness.
Lemma 4. Leaf determinism implies well-formedness, i.e., v̂ :: τ =⇒ ∀v ∈ v̂ . v : τ .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of v̂ :: τ . 
The connection holds the other way around as well. Given a well-formed value, the singleton set of that value is leaf
deterministic, i.e.:
Lemma 5. Well-formed singletons are leaf deterministic, i.e., v : τ =⇒ {v} :: τ .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of v : τ . 
With this we can prove that expressions preserve leaf determinism, i.e., that if a well-typed expression e is evaluated in
a leaf deterministic environment the result is leaf deterministic.
Theorem 6. Preservation of leaf determinism of expressions.
Ω ` e : τ ∧ Mˆ :: Ω ∧ 〈Mˆ, e〉 ⇓ vˆ ∧ vˆ 6= ∅ =⇒ vˆ :: τ .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Ω ` e : τ ; let the assumptions be labeled as follows: (2)Ω ` e : τ , (3) Mˆ :: Ω ,
(4) 〈Mˆ, e〉 ⇓ vˆ, and (5) vˆ 6= ∅. We want to show that vˆ :: τ . We only give the cases relating to encryption, i.e. (T-ENC1),
(T-ENC2), and (T-DEC). We refer the reader to the formal proof for the proofs for (T-INT), (T-VAR), (T-PAIR), (T-FST), (T-SND), and
(T-OP). Let i ∈ {1, 2} in the following.
(T-ENC1) We have that e = encryptHK (e1, e2), (6)Ω ` e1 : key HK, and (7)Ω ` e2 : τ . Now, (4) gives (8) 〈Mˆ, e1〉 ⇓ kˆ,
(9) 〈Mˆ, e2〉 ⇓ vˆ′, (10) kˆ ⊆ KeyHK, and (S1) vˆ = {v | k ∈ kˆ, v′ ∈ vˆ′, v ∈ Eγ (k, v′)}.
We want to show that vˆ :: encHK τ σ , which is immediate given that kˆ :: key HK, i.e. kˆ a singleton set, and vˆ′ :: τ .
Both results are obtainable via the induction hypotheses.
In more detail, the interpretation of the set comprehension, (S1), gives the following (11) k ∈ kˆ ∧ v′ ∈ vˆ′ ∧ v ∈
Eγ (k, v′) =⇒ v ∈ vˆ, and (12) v ∈ vˆ =⇒ ∃k ∈ kˆ, v′ ∈ vˆ′ . v ∈ Eγ (k, v′).
Now, (5, 12) give (13) k ∈ kˆ, (14) v′ ∈ vˆ′, and (15) v ∈ Eγ (k, v′) for some k, some v, and some v ∈ vˆ.
With this we can apply the induction hypotheses, which give (16) kˆ :: key HK, and (17) vˆ′ :: τ .
Now, (16) gives that kˆ is singleton, i.e. (18) kˆ = {k} for k introduced in (13) .
To show vˆ :: τ we must show that vˆ′ :: τ , v′ ∈ vˆ′ ∧ v ∈ Eγ (k, v′) =⇒ v ∈ vˆ, and v ∈ vˆ =⇒ ∃v′ ∈ vˆ′ . v ∈
Eγ (k, v′) for the same k, which is possible because of (18). The former two are immediate from (17) and (11)
respectively; the latter is immediate from (12, 18), where (18) is crucial for the applicability of (12).
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(T-ENC2) Identical to (T-ENC1)with references to high keys replaced by references to low keys.
(T-DEC) We have that e = decryptγ (e1, e2), (6)Ω ` e1 : key γ , and (7)Ω ` e2 : encγ τ σ . Now, (4) gives (8) 〈Mˆ, e1〉 ⇓ kˆ,
(9) 〈Mˆ, e2〉 ⇓ uˆ, (10) k ⊆ Keyγ , and (S1) vˆ = {Dγ (k, u) | k ∈ kˆ, u ∈ uˆ}. We want to show that vˆ :: τ , which is given
from the leaf determinism of kˆ :: key γ , and uˆ :: encγ τ σ both obtainable from the induction hypotheses. The
former guarantees that kˆ is a singleton set, and the latter gives vˆ′ = {v | u ∈ Eγ (k, v), u ∈ û} :: τ , for some key
k. Now, vˆ 6= ∅ allows us to conclude vˆ :: τ , since the fact that decryption with the wrong key fails allows us to
establish that kˆ = {k}, and thus vˆ = vˆ′, since they are both the set of values obtained by decrypting û using k.
In more detail, the interpretation of the set comprehension, (S1), gives the following (11) k ∈ kˆ ∧ u ∈ uˆ =⇒
Dγ (k, u) ∈ vˆ, and (12) v ∈ vˆ =⇒ ∃k ∈ kˆ, u ∈ uˆ . v = Dγ (k, u). Now, (5, 12) give (13) k ∈ kˆ, (14) u ∈ uˆ,
and (15) v = Dγ (k, u) for some k, and some u. With this the induction hypotheses are applicable, which give
(16) kˆ :: key γ , and (17) uˆ :: encγ τ σ . From (16) we get that kˆ is singleton, i.e. that (18) kˆ = {k} for k introduced in
(13). From (17)we get that {v | u ∈ Eγ (k′, v), u ∈ û} :: τ , for some k′.
Let vˆ′ = {v | u ∈ Eγ (k′, v), u ∈ û}; we have that (19) v′ ∈ vˆ′ =⇒ ∃u ∈ uˆ . u ∈ Eγ (k′, v), and
(20) u ∈ uˆ =⇒ ∃v′ ∈ vˆ′ . u ∈ Eγ (k′, v′).
From (20, 14) we have that u ∈ Eγ (k′, v′) for some v′ ∈ vˆ′. This means that v′ = Dγ (k′, u); at the same time
(15) gives us that v = Dγ (k, u), which allows us to conclude that k′ = k, since we have assumed that decryption
with the wrong key fails.
Now, it remains to be shown that vˆ = vˆ′.
case v′ ∈ vˆ′ =⇒ v′ ∈ vˆ Assume, (21) v′ ∈ vˆ′; from (19, 21) we have that (22) u′ ∈ uˆ, and (23) u′ ∈ Eγ (k, v′) for
some u′. From (11, 22)wehave thatDγ (k, u′) ∈ vˆ, butDγ (k, u′) = v′ from (23), since decryption is left inverse
of encryption, and we are done.
case v ∈ vˆ =⇒ v ∈ vˆ′ Assume (21) v ∈ vˆ; from (12, 21) we have that (22) k ∈ kˆ (k because of (18)), (23) u′ ∈ uˆ
for some u′, and (24) v = Dγ (k, u). Now, (23, 20) give (25) u ∈ Eγ (k, v′) for some v′ ∈ vˆ′. From (25) we have
that (26) v′ = Dγ (k, u), since decryption is left inverse of encryption. Now, since decryption is a deterministic
function this means that v′ = v and we are done. 
5.3. Noninterference
Before we can define noninterference for expressions, we need to lift the low-equivalence relation to sets. We say that
two sets of values are possibilistically low-equivalent if for every value in one there exists a low-equivalent one in the other.
For values and variable environments this is formulated as follows:
v1 ∈ v̂1 =⇒ ∃v2 ∈ v̂2 . v1 ∼τ v2
v2 ∈ v̂2 =⇒ ∃v1 ∈ v̂1 . v1 ∼τ v2
v̂1 ∼τ v̂2
M1 ∈ M̂1 =⇒ ∃M2 ∈ M̂2 .M1 ∼Ω M2
M2 ∈ M̂2 =⇒ ∃M1 ∈ M̂1 .M1 ∼Ω M2
M̂1 ∼Ω M̂2
.
First, we define noninterference for expressions, which is equivalent to the noninterference of statements defined above.
Put simply, if two expressions e1 and e2 are run in low-equivalent sets of variable environments, yielding sets of values,
then these sets of values should be low-equivalent. More precisely, if an expression e is well-typed in the variable type
environmentΩ , yielding a result of type τ , then if the expression is successfully run in any pair of low-equivalent variable
environments (w.r.t. Ω) then the resulting pair of sets of values should be low-equivalent w.r.t. τ . For expressions this is
not enough; noninterference is only provable for leaf deterministic environments. Thus, we demand preservation of low-
equivalence only for leaf deterministic sets of variable environments.
NI(e1, e2)Ω,τ ≡ ∀M̂1, M̂2 . M̂1 :: Ω ∧ M̂2 :: Ω ∧ M̂1 ∼Ω M̂2∧
〈M̂1, e1〉 ⇓ vˆ1 ∧ 〈M̂2, e2〉 ⇓ vˆ2 ∧ vˆ1 6= ∅ ∧ vˆ2 6= ∅ =⇒ v̂1 ∼τ v̂2.
With this we can formulate and prove security for well-typed expressions. Because of the set-lifted low-equivalence,
proving v̂1 ∼τ v̂2 amounts to proving (1) v1 ∈ v̂1 =⇒ ∃v2 ∈ v̂2 . v1 ∼τ v2, and, similarly, (2) v2 ∈ v̂2 =⇒ ∃v1 ∈ v̂1 . v1 ∼τ
v2. The proofs of (1) and (2) are symmetric. For brevity we only prove one direction, and only give the proof cases dealing
with encryption below; the other cases are completely standard and can be found in the formal proof.
Theorem 7. Security of expressions (set-lifted version) Ω ` e : τ =⇒ NI(e, e)Ω,τ .
Proof. First, let us write out the full theorem and enumerate the assumptions.
(1)Ω ` e : τ =⇒ (2) M̂1 :: Ω ∧ (3) M̂2 :: Ω ∧ (4) M̂1 ∼Ω M̂2∧
(5) 〈M̂1, e〉 ⇓ vˆ1 ∧ (6) 〈M̂2, e〉 ⇓ vˆ2 ∧ (7) vˆ1 6= ∅ ∧ (8) vˆ2 6= ∅ =⇒ v̂1 ∼τ v̂2.
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Let i ∈ {1, 2} in the following; The proof proceeds by an induction on the type derivation (1), in the form on a case-by-
case analysis on the last type rule applied. We only consider the rules involving encryption and decryption, and (T-VAR); the
latter serves as a representative for the other rules, which are completely standard.
(T-VAR)
We have that e = x, and (9)Ω(x) = τ . We want to show that ∀v1 ∈ vˆ1 ∃v2 ∈ vˆ2 . v1 ∼τ v2.
Assuming (10) v1 ∈ vˆ1; (5, 6) give vˆi = {v | M ∈ Mˆi, M(x) = v}. The interpretation of the set comprehension
gives (11i) ∀v ∈ vˆi ∃M ∈ Mˆi .M(x) = v, and (12i) ∀M v .M ∈ Mˆi ∧M(x) = v =⇒ v ∈ vˆi.
Thus, from (10, 111)we have that (13) M1(x) = v1 for someM1.
From (4)we have that (14) ∀M1 ∈ Mˆ1 ∃M2 ∈ Mˆ2 .M1 ∼Ω M2, which gives (15) M2 ∈ Mˆ2, and (16) M1 ∼Ω M2 for
someM2.
Now, (16) gives (17) ∀x τ .Ω(x) = τ =⇒ ∃v1 v2 .M1(x) = v1 ∧M2(x) = v2 ∧ v1 ∼τ v2.
Thus, (17, 9) yield M1(x) = v1 for v1 from (11) above, since M1 is a function, (18) M2(x) = v2 for some v2, and
(19) v1 ∼τ v2.
Finally, (122, 15, 18) allow us to conclude that (20) v2 ∈ vˆ2, and we are done.
(T-ENC1) We have that e = encryptHK (e1, e2), (9)Ω ` e1 : key HK, and (10)Ω ` e2 : τ . We want to show that∀v1 ∈ vˆ1 ∃v2 ∈ vˆ2 . v1 ∼encHK τ L v2.
Assuming (11) v1 ∈ vˆ1; (5, 6) give (12i) 〈Mˆi, e1〉 ⇓ kˆi, (13i) 〈Mˆi, e2〉 ⇓ vˆ′i , (14i) kˆi ⊆ KeyHK, and vˆi = {v | k ∈ kˆi, v′ ∈
vˆ′i , v ∈ Eγ (k, v′)}. The interpretation of the set comprehension gives (15i) ∀k ∈ kˆi v′ ∈ vˆ′i . v ∈ EHK(k, v′) =⇒ v ∈
vˆi, and (16i) ∀v ∈ vˆi∃v′ ∈ vˆ′ik ∈ kˆi . v ∈ EHK(k, v′).
Now, from (161, 11) we have (17) v′1 ∈ vˆ′1, (18) k1 ∈ kˆ1, and (19) v1 ∈ EHK(k1, v′1). Similarly, (8) ensures the
existence values in vˆ2, and thus also in vˆ′2, and kˆ2.
With this the induction hypotheses gives us (20) kˆ1 ∼HK kˆ2, and (21) vˆ′1 ∼τ vˆ′2.
In turn, (20) gives (22) ∀k1 ∈ kˆ1∃k2 ∈ kˆ2 . k1 ∼HK k2, and (21) gives (23) ∀v′1 ∈ vˆ′1∃v′2 ∈ vˆ′2 . v′1 ∼τ v′2.
Thus, (17, 23) give (24) v′2 ∈ vˆ′2 for some v′2, and (25) v′1 ∼τ v′2. Similarly, (18, 22) give (26) k2 ∈ kˆ2 for some k2,
and (27) k1 ∼HK k2.
Now, Eq. (1) from Section 3.3 together with (19) gives us (28) v2 ∈ EHK(k2, v′2) for some v2 such that (29) v1 .= v2.
From (152, 26, 24, 28) we get (30) v2 ∈ vˆ2, and from the fact that decryption is a left inverse of encryption
together with (29, 27, 25, 28, 19), and (LE-ENC-L1) allows us to draw the conclusion that v1 ∼encHK τ L v2, and we
are done.
(T-ENC2) We have that e = encryptHK (e1, e2), (9)Ω ` e1 : key LK, and (10)Ω ` e2 : τ . We want to show that∀v1 ∈ vˆ1 ∃v2 ∈ vˆ2 . v1 ∼encLK τ σ v2.
The proof for (T-ENC2) is similar to the proof for (T-ENC1). The only difference is that we proceed with a case on
σ .
case σ = L
The proof is identical to proof of (T-ENC1), with all lemmas regarding secret encryption replaced by their
public encryption equivalents (Eq. (1) from Section 3.3 does not have a public encryption equivalent—there is
no need since (LE-ENC-L2) does not demand v1
.= v2).
case σ = H
The result is immediate from the existence of v2 ∈ vˆ2 established in the above case, and (LE-ENC-H).
(T-DEC)We have that e = decryptγ (e1, e2), (9)Ω ` e1 : key γ , and (10)Ω ` e2 : encγ τ σ . We want to show that
∀v1 ∈ vˆ1 ∃v2 ∈ vˆ2 . v1 ∼τσ v2.
Assuming (10) v1 ∈ vˆ1; (5, 6) give (12i) 〈Mˆi, e1〉 ⇓ kˆi, (13i) 〈Mˆi, e2〉 ⇓ vˆ′i , (14i) kˆ ⊆ Keyγ , and vˆi = {Dγ (k, v′) | k ∈
kˆi, v′ ∈ vˆ′i}. The interpretation of the set comprehension gives (15i) ∀ki ∈ kˆi v′i ∈ vˆ′i . vi = Dγ (ki, v′i) =⇒ vi ∈ vˆi,
and (16i) ∀vi ∈ vˆi∃v′i ∈ vˆ′i , ki ∈ kˆi . vi = Dγ (ki, v′i).
Now, (161, 10) give us that (17) v′1 ∈ vˆ′1, (18) k1 ∈ kˆ1, and (19) v1 = Dγ (k1, v′1).
From (8)weget the existence of v3 ∈ vˆ2, which via (162) gives (20) v′3 ∈ vˆ′2, (21) k2 ∈ kˆ2, and (22) v3 = Dγ (k2, v′3).
From the induction hypotheses we can now show that (23) kˆ1 ∼γ kˆ2, and (24) vˆ′1 ∼encγ τ σ vˆ′2.
Further, (23, 24) give (25) ∀k1 ∈ kˆ1 ∃k2 ∈ kˆ2 . k1 ∼γ k2, and (26) ∀v′1 ∈ vˆ′1 ∃v′2 ∈ vˆ′2 . v′1 ∼encγ τσ v′2.
Theorem 6 gives that (27i) kˆi :: γ , which, in turn, yields that kˆi are singleton sets, i.e. (28i) kˆi = {ki}, for
ki introduced in (18, 21). Thus, (25, 18) give (29) k2 ∈ kˆ2, and (30) k1 ∼γ k2; (26, 17) give (31) v′2 ∈ vˆ′2, and
(32) v′1 ∼encγ τσ v′2.
We proceed by a case analysis of the key level γ and σ .
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case γ = LK
We have (30), i.e. k1 ∼LK k2 gives that k1 = k2 and, thus, that (33) kˆ1 = kˆ2 by (28i).
case σ = L
Now, (32), i.e. v′1 ∼encLK τL v′2, gives (34i) v′′i = DLK(k′i, v′i), for some k′i ,and some v′′i , (35) v′′1 ∼tolow(τ ) v′′2 .
From (28i) k′i = ki, from (19) and since decryption is a deterministic function v′′1 = v1; let v′′2 be denoted
v2 in the following. Now, v2 ∈ vˆ2 by (152, 29, 31, 342), and v1 ∼τ L v2 ≡ v1 ∼τ v2, which is immediate from
(35).
case σ = H
(8) gives us v2 ∈ vˆ2 for some v2; v1 ∼τ H v2 is easily proven for any vi.
case γ = HK
We have (32), i.e. v′1 ∼encHK τL v′2, gives (34i) v′′i = DLK(k′i, v′i), for some k′i ,and some v′′i , (35) v′′1 ∼τ v′′2 .
From (28i) k′i = ki, from (19) and since decryption is a deterministic function v′′1 = v1; let v′′2 be denoted v2
in the following. Now, v2 ∈ vˆ2 by (152, 29, 31, 342), and we are done. 
With this we are ready to state and prove the top-level security theorem for expressions corresponding to the top-level
security statement for commands stated previously in Section 3.3
Theorem 8. Security of expressions (top-level version)
(1)Ω ` e : τ =⇒ (2) M1 : Ω ∧ (3) M2 : Ω ∧ (4) M1 ∼Ω M2∧
(5) 〈M1, e〉 ⇓ vˆ1 ∧ (6) 〈M2, e〉 ⇓ vˆ2 ∧ (7) vˆ1 6= ∅ ∧ (8) vˆ2 6= ∅ =⇒ v̂1 ∼τ v̂2.
Proof. In the following, let i ∈ {1, 2}. Again, we only show one direction; the other direction is symmetric. Thus, we must
show that v1 ∈ v̂1 =⇒ ∃v2 ∈ v̂2 . v1 ∼τ v2.
Assume (9) v1 ∈ v̂1; (8) gives the existence of (10) v2 ∈ v̂2. Now, (5, 6) give (11i) ∀v . 〈Mi, e〉 ⇓ v ⇐⇒ v ∈ vˆi. Now,
(9, 10, 11i) give 〈Mi, e〉 ⇓ vi, and Lemma 2 gives the existence of vˆ′i such that (12i) 〈{Mi}, e〉 ⇓ vˆ′i and (13i) vi ∈ vˆ′i . Noting that
by Lemma 5 we have that {Mi} :: Ω from Mi : Ω , Theorem 7 becomes applicable and gives (14) v̂′1 ∼τ v̂′2. Now, (14) gives
v1 ∈ v̂′1 =⇒ ∃v2 ∈ v̂′2 . v1 ∼τ v2, and, thus, there exists v2 such that (15) v1 ∼τ v2. Now, from Lemma 3 and (132) we get
that (16) 〈{M2}, e〉 ⇓ v2.
With this we are done; we have already proven v1 ∼τ v2 (15) and v2 ∈ v̂2 is immediate from (112). 
For commands, the corresponding top-level security theorem is as follows. Since the commands do not include anything
specific to encryption the proof is straightforward.
Theorem 9. Security of commands (top-level version)
(1)Σ1, L ` c ∧ (2) E1 : Σ ∧ (3) E2 : Σ ∧ (4) E1 ∼Σ E2 ∧
(5) 〈E1, c〉 ⇓ Eˆ ′1 ∧ (6) 〈E2, c〉 ⇓ Eˆ ′2 ∧ (7) Eˆ ′1 6= ∅ ∧ (8) Eˆ ′2 6= ∅ =⇒ Eˆ ′1 ∼Σ Eˆ ′2
where Eˆ1 ∼Σ Eˆ2 is the immediate set-lifted structural extension of low-equivalence to environments, and E : Σ is the structural
extension of well-formedness to environments.
Proof. By induction on the derivation ofΣ1, L ` c. 
6. Extensions
In this section we consider two extensions: integrity and public-key cryptography.
6.1. Integrity
Confidentiality classifies information into public (low-confidentiality) and secret (high-confidentiality), i.e., information
that may or may not be given to the world, respectively. Dually, integrity classifies information into untrusted (or low-
integrity) and trusted (or high-integrity), i.e., whether the information may or may not have been affected by the world.
Tracking the integrity of data enables us to explore some additional dimensions of cryptography: weaknesses of the
encryption algorithms and the effect of encryption on integrity. Consider for example, a primitive that is vulnerable to
chosen-ciphertext attacks. With integrity controls, it is natural to express the restriction that untrusted encrypted values
may not be decrypted.
In the presence of integrity the security levels for values are pairs of the form (σ , ι), where σ is a confidentiality level,
and ι is a corresponding integrity level. The following tables define two functions – safeE (α, (σ , ι)) and safeD(α, (σ , ι)) –
that indicate if it is safe to encrypt (decrypt) a plaintext (ciphertext) of security level (σ , ι)with an encryption scheme that
has property α. Here α ranges over standard notions [5]—IND-CCA (indistinguishable under chosen-ciphertext attacks) and
IND-CPA (indistinguishable under chosen-plaintext attacks).
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(H,H) (L,L) (H,L) (L,H)
IND-CCA safe safe safe safe
IND-CPA safe safe safe safe
(H,H) (L,L) (H,L) (L,H)
IND-CCA safe safe safe safe
IND-CPA safe - - safe
safeE (α, (σ , ι)) safeD (α, (σ , ι))
In this waywe can provide different type rules for different assumptions on the vulnerability properties of the encryption
and decryption algorithms:
(T-ENC*)
Ω ` e1 : key HK Ω ` e2 : τ lvl(τ ) = (σ , ι) safeE (α, (σ , ι))
Ω ` encryptαHK (e1, e2) : encHK τ (L, H)
(T-DEC*)
Ω ` e1 : key γ safeD(α, (σ , ι)) Ω ` e2 : encγ τ (σ , ι)
Ω ` decryptαγ (e1, e2) : τ (σ ,ι)
6.2. A note on the integrity of keys
The current model allows very limited interaction with keys apart from encryption. Since the values of keys cannot be
programmatically inspected, the power of the attacker is limited to choosing between secure keys. Thus, the model cannot
in its present form distinguish between encryption with high and low-integrity keys w.r.t. confidentiality. The intuition is
clear: since the attacker can only choose between secure keys, that choice will give different but safe encrypted values.
6.3. Public-key cryptography
Even though the present systemdeals onlywith symmetric-key cryptography, there is nothing in themodel that prevents
modeling public-key cryptography. The set of high keyswould contain the private keys and the set of low keyswould contain
the public keys, where the private keys and the public keys are dual. In this system values encrypted with public keys would
be considered low, since only actors with access to the private keys would be able to decrypt them.
However, public-key cryptography is most interesting in the presence of integrity. In the same way we can model that
encryption of secrets using secret keys results in low values, we can model that encryption raises the integrity of the
encrypted value to the integrity of the key, which corresponds to signing.
7. Programming with encryption: Examples
We have implemented a prototype of the type system and mechanically type-checked two applications: secure backup
and aWide-Mouthed-Frog protocol implementation. In both examples the type systemprevents dangerous insecurities such
as sending sensitive unencrypted data over a low channel or not using a secret key for encryption. This section discusses
some interesting fragments of these implementations. 2
7.1. Secure data backup
1 K key HK;
2 backup enc HK (int H) L;
3
4 actor Backup {
5 data int H;
6 ctxt enc HK (int H) L;
7 data := ...
8 ctxt := encryptHK(K, data);
9 out backup ctxt;
10 }
Listing 2. Backup code
In the secure backup scenario a low-confidentiality channel is used
for sending sensitive information to the remote storage. Listing 2
presents the code for the backup operation. Here and belowwe aid the
reader by providing explicit variable type declarations.
We declare high key K and low channel backup. The type of the latter
says that only encrypted high integers may be sent over this channel.
Lines 5 and7declare and initialize a high integer variable data. Line 6
declares the variable ctxt of type enc HK (int H) L. On line 8 the value of
variable data is encrypted with high key K and the resulting ciphertext
is assigned to the variable ctxt. Since type of ctxt matches the type of
the backup channel it might be sent over this channel. This is done by
the out command on line 9.
2 In the examples below some variables and channels that are shared between actors are declared before the code for actors. This is done to avoid double
declarations and the prototype implementation uses these global declarations when building local environments of every actor.
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1 actor Restore {
2 data int H;
3 ctxt enc HK (int H) L;
4 in ctxt backup;
5 data := decryptHK(K, ctxt);
6 }
Listing 3. Recovery code
When recovering data, an actor reads the data from the low channel
and decrypts it. Assuming the same global declarations Listing 3
presents the recovery code. Here, line 4 reads data from the backup
channel. It is decrypted using the key K on line 5.
An example of an easy-to-overlook error is to have the following
line in place of line 9 in the body of actor Backup: out backup data;. This
is an insecurity that the type system rejects. Generally, in the secure
backup example the type system ensures that secret data is encrypted
before it is sent over the backup channel, thus preventing accidental leaks.
1 Kas key HK;
2 chanS <int L, enc HK (<int L, <int L, key HK>>) L>;
3 chanAB enc HK (int H) L;
4 actor A {
5 idA int L; idB int L; tsA int L;
6 messageToB int H;
7 Kab key HK;
8 // ... initialization
9 newkey (Kab, HK);
10 out chanS <idA, encryptHK(Kas, <tsA,<idB, Kab>>)>;
11 out chanAB encryptHK (Kab, messageToB);
12 }
Listing 4.WMF Implementation
7.2. Wide-Mouthed-Frog protocol
The Wide-Mouthed-Frog protocol [8] is a simple key exchange protocol with trusted server and timestamps. In this
protocol secret keys KAS and KBS are shared between server S and principals A and B, respectively. Principal A generates a
fresh session key KAB, which is transferred to B in two messages:
1. A → S : A, {TA, B, KAB}KAS
2. S → B : {TS, A, KAB}KBS .
The first message consists of A’s name and a tuple encrypted with the shared key KAS . This tuple contains three elements—
a timestamp TA, the name of principal B, and a generated key KAB. Upon receipt of this message, S decrypts it, checks the
timestamp, replaces TA with its own timestamp TS , encrypts itwith keyKBS , and forwards the resultingmessage to B. Principal
B then checks whether the second message is timely.
Obviously, there is more to implementation of the protocol than expressed by the two-step description. Our type
system guarantees that implementations do not introduce information-flow leaks in the protocol. Listing 4 presents the
implementation of this protocol for principal A.
This program declares two channels: chanS for communicating with the server, and chanAB for sending messages to B,
once the key has been exchanged. The type of the channel chanS corresponds to the first message in the protocol—a pair
consisting of a low integer and an encryption with high key of a three-element tuple (expressed by nested pairs). Since the
level of the key used for encrypting this tuple is high, it is safe to label the result of encryption as low. The body of the actor
declaration defines low-confidentiality variables idA and idB that stand for the names of the principals; variable tsA stores
the current timestamp; the high-confidentiality variable messageToB contains the information that A wants to send to B.
The new key is generated on line 9. Line 10 constructs the first message of the protocol and sends it to the server. Line 11
uses the newly generated key and sends the secret message to the principal B.
The following listing presents the code for the actors Server and B in the Wide-mouthed-frog protocol implementation.
Here we assume existence of appropriate macros IS_FRESH and GET_TIME.
Kbs key HK; // shared keys
// channel for accepting requests
chanS <int L, enc HK (<int L, <int L, key HK>>) L >;
// channels for communicating with principals
chanA enc HK ( <int L, <int L, key HK>> ) L;
chanB enc HK ( <int L, <int L, key HK>> ) L;
actor S {
idA int L; idB int L;
tsS int L; // time stamp
... // initialize identifiers
while (1) {
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idFrom int L; idTo int L; tsFrom int L; Kab key HK;
request <int L, enc HK (<int L, <int L, key HK>>) L>;
msg <int L, <int L, key HK>>;
in request chanS; // accepting a request from a principal
idFrom := fst (request);
if idFrom == idA then {
msg := decryptHK(Kas, snd (request));
} else {
msg := decryptHK(Kbs, snd (request));
};
tS := GET_TIME
tsFrom := fst(msg);
if IS_FRESH(tsFrom, tsS) then {
idTo := fst (snd(msg));
Kab := snd (snd(msg));
// forwarding the request to the other principal
if idTo == idA then {
out chanA encryptHK(Kas, <tsS, <idFrom, Kab>>);
} else {if idTo == idB then {
out chanB encryptHK(Kbs, <tsS, <idFrom, Kab>>);
} else {};};
} else {} ;
};
}
actor B {
ctxt enc HK ( <int L, <int L, key HK>> ) L;
msg <int L, <int L, key HK>>;
Kab key HK; idFrom int L;
tsS int L; tsB int L;
... // initialize identifiers and timestamp
in ctxt chanB;
msg := decryptHK (Kbs, ctxt);
tsS := fst (msg);
if IS_FRESH(tsS, tsB) then {
idFrom := fst (snd (msg));
Kab := snd (snd(msg));
// get a message from A
cmsg enc HK (int H) L;
in cmsg chanAB;
messageFromA int H;
messageFromA := decryptHK(Kab, cmsg);
} else {};
}
In this example, the type system prevents nonsecret session keys in the key establishment protocol. As in the previous
example, it also guarantees that secret information may not leave the system unless it is encrypted with a secret key.
8. Related work
As mentioned in the introduction, declassification models are sometimes used to justify cryptographic primitives in
languages with information-flow control. Declassification mechanisms facilitate information release. A recent classification
of declassification [32] suggests that information release policies represent aspects of what is declassified, by whom, when
andwhere in the system. These correspond to dimensions of information release. The relation of ourmodel to declassification
is somewhat subtle, because the goal of masking is information hiding rather than information release.
Furthermore, attempts at framing cryptographically-masked flows into different dimensions do not always lead to
satisfactory results. For example, releasing the difference between two values of a secret whenever the results of its
encryption are different can be a deceptive policy when assumptions about the underlying cryptographic primitives are
not explicitly stated. If the underlying encryption function is bijective (assuming the key is fixed) then releasing the result of
encryption is equivalent to releasing the secret itself. This phenomenon applies to typical policies from thewhat dimension,
such as delimited release [31].
Another example of releasing the secret itself, together with the result of a cryptographic primitive applied to the secret,
can be found in [9]. The password checker example is based on matching the hash of the password with the hash of a user
query. The password has a label H cert L, which means that the level of the password is eventually declassified from high to
low. This, however, allows the password itself to be released to the attacker in cleartext.
Nevertheless, declassification is meaningful in the context of cryptographic computation when the attacker is capable of
learning some information from the ciphertext. Temporal policies expresswhen, at the earliest, the attacker might learn the
secret. Volpano and Smith’s relative secrecy [37,36] guarantees that the attacker cannot learn the secret in polynomial time
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in the size of the secret. Approaches by Laud [20,21], Laud and Vene [23], provide computational guarantees for a simple
imperative language but with the assumption that keys can be statically distinguished. Smith and Alpizar [33] present a
type system for a language with random assignment, encryption, and decryption and establish computational security for
typable programs.
As mentioned previously, Laud’s recent work [22] adopts this article as a starting point and bridges cryptographically-
masked flows with computational security. In fact, Laud formally proves a conjecture from an earlier version [2] of this
article that SEM-CPA and INT-PTXT properties of underlying cryptographic primitives (extended to hide key identities) are
sufficient to guarantee computational security for programs that satisfy our possibilistic noninterference.
Mitchell et al. [24,26] reason about security with respect to polynomial-time attackers for a form of the pi calculus.
A source of our inspiration is Abadi’s secrecy model for symmetric-key cryptographic protocols [1]. This model assumes
that an attacker is unable to decrypt ciphertexts encryptedwith secret keys. Compared to [1], we end upwith simpler typing
rules. For example, because of the probabilistic encryption assumption, we do not need to deal with explicit confounders.
In addition, our approach accommodates natural extensions with integrity and public-key cryptography. Another source
of inspiration is a logical relation technique by Sumii and Pierce that facilitates manual security proofs for cryptographic
protocols [34]. This technique is not accompanied by static enforcement mechanisms (such as a type system), however.
Gordon and Jeffrey [18] extend Abadi’swork tomultiple security levels thatmay be dynamically created andmay become
compromised. This and other work within Gordon and Jeffrey’s Cryptyc project, however, rely on trace-based properties
(such as correspondence) that are weaker than noninterference. Dam and Giambiagi’s work on admissibility [13,16] focuses
on protocol implementation, with the goal that information leaks in the implementation must adhere to those declared in
protocol specification.
Duggan’s and Chothia et al.’s cryptographic types [15,10] help enforce security for a distributed programming language.
This is realized through a combination of static and dynamic checks, leading to access-control guarantees (albeit without
information-flow guarantees) for secrecy and integrity. Myers et al.’s qualified robustness [28] is based on a possibilistic
treatment of endorsement, operation dual to declassification.
Hicks et al. [19] define a notion of noninterference modulo trusted functions, which requires parts of programs free
of cryptographic functions to be in a certain sense indistinguishable. The cryptographic functions are trusted to release
information if their security labels satisfy trust constraints. It is aworthwhile direction for futurework to formally investigate
the relation to noninterference modulo trusted functions. We do not expect it to be straightforward because the definition of
the indistinguishability relation from [19] involves two-level semantics.
Vaughan and Zdancewic [35] present a language in which security labels are connected to public-key cryptography.
Based on the decentralized labelmodel [27], they explore rich confidentiality and integrity policies. However, their semantic
security condition appears to relate all ciphertexts as indistinguishable, which may result in occlusion (cf. Section 3.2).
Finally, the first and last authors have proposed a gradual release framework [4] that unifies revelation-based and
encryption-based policies. This framework conservatively extends cryptographically-masked flows with possibilities of
reasoning about key release, and offers a type-based enforcement mechanism that prevents premature key release.
9. Conclusions
We have developed an approach to tracking information flow in the presence of cryptographic operations, based on
possibilistic noninterference. We have argued that a possibilistic treatment of cryptographic operations leads to a natural
model of attackers thatmay not learn useful information from ciphertexts. Thismodel has a close connection to probabilistic
encryption and it naturally connects to computational adversary models [22].
Our case for possibilistic noninterference is driven by the possibility of capitalizing on the available machinery for
reasoning about noninterference in programming languages. We have demonstrated that possibilistic noninterference can
be provably and straightforwardly enforced via a security type system for a language that includes cryptographic primitives
and message passing. We have formalized the main proof of soundness in the proof assistant Coq. The type system is
amenable to extensions, including integrity and public-key cryptography, which makes it attractive for developing secure
implementations of nontrivial cryptographic protocols.
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